

Warrior Spirit: What it is and How to Make it Happen

**A Monograph
by
Major Robert C. Johnson
Field Artillery**




**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
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ABSTRACT

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by Major Robert C. Johnson, USA, 57 pages.

A review of Army leadership doctrine exposes a disconnect. Army doctrine states that development of the "warrior spirit" in soldiers, leaders, and organizations is vital to the Army's success. However, the Army does not have a uniform definition for the term "warrior spirit" in its leadership doctrine.

This monograph defines and discusses techniques that a tactical level leader can use to foster the development of a "warrior spirit" in his unit. The monograph fulfills the requirements discussed above through an examination of theory, doctrine, and history. The discussion on theory and doctrine is the basis to develop a "straw-man" definition for warrior spirit as a point of departure. The discussion on two historical cases offers insight into techniques tactical commanders used to develop the warrior spirit in their units. Finally, analysis of the historical cases through the framework of the "straw-man" definition captures the essence of developing the warrior spirit.

The monograph concludes that actions a leader can take to develop an organizational identity, to promote unit cohesion, to decentralize command and control, and lead by example are the keys to developing the warrior spirit. The monograph ends with a recommendation that the Army provide focus to leader development programs Army-wide by modifying leadership doctrine to reflect the following definition for warrior spirit:

Warrior Spirit: the psychological perspective present in individuals, groups, organizations, and institutions that underpins the will to fight, the willingness to take calculated risks, and a commitment to duty exhibited through actions directed toward mission accomplishment regardless of the odds or conditions.

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MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Major Robert C. Johnson

Title of Monograph: Warrior Spirit: What It Is and
How to Make It Happen.

Approved by:

George P. Ritter
LTC George P. Ritter

Monograph Director

Robert H. Berlin
Robert H. Berlin, Ph. D.

Deputy Director, School of
Advanced Military Studies

Philip J. Brookes
Philip J. Brookes, Ph. D.

Director, Graduate Degree
Program

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Warrior Spirit: What It Is and How to Make It Happen.

I. INTRODUCTION

A review of Army leadership doctrine exposes a disconnect. The Army seeks to develop the "warrior spirit" in soldiers, leaders, and organizations. Development of the warrior spirit is vital to the Army's success in peacetime, conflict, and war:

". . . our warfighting doctrine, training, force development, special operations forces, initiatives, and programs are dependent on soldiers possessing a healthy warrior spirit."¹

However, the Army does not have a uniform definition for the term "warrior spirit" in its leadership doctrine.²

Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary says that to define is the action of describing, explaining, or making definite and clear.³ The monograph will define the term "warrior spirit." A suitable definition must clearly describe and explain the nature, properties, and capture the essence of the term. For the definition to be useful it must be consistent with historical experience and capture the common threads

from historical examples for application purposes.

The monograph will also offer ways in which a tactical level leader can develop warrior spirit consistent with this "new" definition. Fulfilling these two purposes corrects a deficiency in the Army's leadership doctrine and provides a standard definition that can then serve as a unifying agent for the leader development process Army-wide.

The monograph will fulfill the requirements discussed above through an examination of theory, doctrine, and history. Theoretical and doctrinal concepts are the basis from which to develop a "straw-man" definition for warrior spirit as a point of departure. Next, an investigation of two historical examples offers insight into techniques tactical commanders used to develop the warrior spirit in their organizations. Analysis of the historical examples is through the framework established by the "straw-man" definition. Finally, the monograph concludes by recommending the Army adopt the proposed definition for warrior spirit and recommendations for the modification or improvement of current Army leadership doctrine.

II. THEORETICAL CONCEPTS

Theory is a means to discuss the process that results in the disintegration of the human will in battle. By gaining an appreciation of the factors working against sustainment of will, one is better able to understand the foundations of Army leadership doctrine.

Clausewitz wrote that "military activity is never directed against material forces alone; it is always aimed simultaneously at the moral forces which give it life, and the two cannot be separated." He regarded the principal moral elements to be the "skill of the commander, the experience and courage of the troops, and their patriotic spirit." He concluded that "in the engagement, the loss of morale has proved the major decisive factor."⁴ Since his time, other military theorists, including Ardant du Picq, Lord Moran, S. L. A. Marshall and Anthony Kellett, have written about the role of man in battle and the effects of battle upon man. In an era of highly lethal technology for waging war, the moral element of combat remains decisive inasmuch as combat remains a clash of wills. Dr. James J. Schneider, a Professor of Military Theory at the School of Advanced Military Studies at the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth,

Kansas, uses the metaphor of lead transforming from a solid state of cohesion, to a liquid state of disorganization, and finally to a gaseous state of disintegration to illustrate the processes leading to the destruction of the human will. Dr. Schneider describes this process using the physical, cybernetic, and moral domains. The "Physical Domain" concerns the entire process of destruction: the effects of weapons, munitions, terrain, weather, logistics, and other physical factors. The "Cybernetic Domain" concerns the processes of organization, command, control, communications, computers, information flow, and human systems. The "Moral Domain" concerns the disintegration and breakdown of will, inspiring, sustaining, and revitalizing trust and morale.⁵ He uses the model at Figure 1 to illustrate the relationship between these elements, the rate of destruction, and casualty rates.⁶

In Dr. Schneider's model, a unit entering combat is a solid, cohesive force. Over time, the process of destruction, especially the tempo of destruction, exerts an influence that begins to transform the unit's nature. Casualty rates increase and unit cohesiveness decreases due to the destructive process. At this point the destructive process has started to change the unit from a solid to a liquid, a cohesive organization

to a disorganized organization. The loss of cohesion impacts on command, control, communications, and intelligence functions. These functions provide the means to keep the unit organized. As these functions erode further, the unit moves from the liquid to the




Figure 1. Destruction, Disorganization, Disintegration.

gaseous state, from being a disorganized unit to a disintegrated unit. The total breakdown of cohesion and organization result in disintegration which is the gaseous state. To deal with the phenomena of destruction, several military theorists have written about the destructive process and the effect it has on the sustainment of will.

THE PHYSICAL DOMAIN

Trevor N. Dupuy, a U. S. Army officer and military theorist of the Twentieth century, wrote on the effects of weapons and munitions as elements of destruction.

Dupuy developed the Theoretical Lethality Index to provide a means of measuring the relative effectiveness of weapons based on such things as range, rate of fire, accuracy, reliability, and rate of damage, etc.⁷

According to Dupuy, increases in lethality make dispersion a requirement for survival. Looking back at history to develop his theory, Dupuy posited that fires, shock action, or a combination of the two, are the primary means of destruction. To obtain the maximum effect from these means required concentrating the maximum number of forces in a small area. This requirement led to the development of close-order formations such as the phalanx.⁸ As advances in technology made weapons and munitions more lethal, close-order formations became obsolete. Survival therefore became more dependant on dispersion.⁹ As dispersion increased, cohesion decreased.

Ardant du Picq, a French Army officer and military theorist of the nineteenth century, wrote on the importance of cohesion as the means to control the soldier's instinct for self-preservation.¹⁰ He argued that individually, man will go to great lengths to kill

without being killed and that the individual strength which allows the soldier to kill comes from the perception that he is stronger than his enemy.¹¹

Should the soldier believe that the enemy is superior, the internal stresses of standing in the face of danger exert such an influence that the soldier feels compelled to flee. The force that urges the soldier to flee is his instinct for self-preservation.¹² Du Picq believed that discipline and organization are the solutions to this problem:

"This is the reason for tactics which prescribe beforehand proper means of organization and action to give unanimity to effort, and for discipline which insures united efforts in spite of the innate weakness of the combatants."¹³

The effects of weapons and munitions mandate the need for dispersion as a means for survival. The loss of cohesion created by dispersing complicates the leadership challenge. The leadership challenge of sustaining the will to fight through retention of cohesive organizations becomes more difficult when one factors in the effects from terrain and weather.

Terrain and weather reduce unit cohesion by impacting primarily on movement, intervisibility, and engageability. Within the phalanx soldiers could see and touch their comrades and their enemies. Increases in weapons' lethality and the resultant dispersion made it more difficult for the soldier to remain in contact

with his comrades and the enemy. Dispersion reduces cohesion by isolating the soldier. Dispersion also increases uncertainty as the soldier no longer sustains visual or physical contact with his enemy. Conditions of isolation and uncertainty increase the soldier's difficulty in coping with his instinct for self-preservation.

Tactical leaders had less trouble in commanding and controlling close-order formations. Close-order formations allowed the unit to remain cohesive despite the battlefield conditions. The effects from improved weapons, more destructive munitions, and weather as elements of the destructive process reduced cohesion by creating the requirement for dispersion as a means for survival. Elimination of the close-order formation increased the difficulty for a force to remain cohesive. Elimination of the close-order formation also complicated the leader's ability to execute command and control functions.

In short, improvements in weapon and munition lethality made the destructive process more effective. Adjustments to the increased effectiveness of the destructive process included dispersion and elimination of close-order formations. Increased dispersion meant decreased cohesion and increased command and control problems.

THE CYBERNETIC DOMAIN

According to Dr. Schneider's model, the physical domain is primarily concerned with weapon systems and their destructive effect. The cybernetic domain is concerned with the effects of disorder that result from the physical process of destruction.

Martin van Creveld, a Professor of History at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, wrote in 1985 on the historical evolution of the command, control, and communications (C³) function.¹⁴ He believes that C³ functions have remained unchanged throughout the history of warfare.¹⁵ However, van Creveld does admit that the manner in which contemporary leaders execute these functions has grown in complexity.¹⁶ Essentially, the change was a shift from a single leader's ability to control a close-order formation in ancient times to that of a commander and large staff in the Post-Industrial Revolutionary period. Dispersion was one of the key causes for change.

Improved weapons' lethality made dispersion a requirement for survival. Dispersion required commanders to develop processes by which they could command and control their distributed forces. Part of this solution was organizational. Commanders began to organize their units for decentralized operations. An increase in decentralization also meant an increase in

the amount of uncertainty to which the commander, his soldiers, and his units became subject.

The degree to which a leader can reduce uncertainty impacts directly on sustainment of the will to fight. When fighting from a close-order formation, a soldier could see his enemy. Being able to see the enemy allowed the soldier to derive a certain degree of comfort. The leadership challenge in employing the close-order formation centered on keeping the unit aligned in its combat configuration. Under these conditions, cohesion was the factor that helped soldiers and units sustain the will to fight. In modern war dispersed units must not only find the enemy, but also remain in contact with other friendly units, neither of which are they usually able to see. Cohesion is one of the factors that helps sustain the will to fight under these conditions. However, there are other elements that a leader must consider.

S. L. A. Marshall, U. S. Army officer and military historian, wrote in 1947 on the human dimension of warfare as the central element holding the cybernetic domain together. Marshall notes that victory in battle is the result of numerous smaller victories found in the engagement and that success in the engagement comes from the application of massed firepower (small arms fire primarily) at the decisive point.¹⁷ The essence

of his argument is that success in battle is the result of numerous smaller distributed actions. Therefore, success on the distributed battlefield depends on the effectiveness and cohesion of numerous small elements.

Increased unit dispersion caused a shift in the way tactical leaders executed their command and control functions. The new command and control process had to be capable of performing three functions: controlling decentralized units; reducing uncertainty; and focusing the action of multiple distributed units. Small unit cohesion, and more importantly, self-discipline of the individual soldier are essential to making the new command and control system work. Therefore, the tactical leader must understand how the process of destruction impacts on individual self-discipline and sustainment of the will to fight.

THE MORAL DOMAIN

The preceding discussions within the cybernetic and physical domains have focused on how the physical process of destruction affects cohesion and disintegration. The moral domain extends the examination by discussing the physical process of destruction and its impact at the individual level. In particular, the moral domain focuses on the battlefield dimension intimately linked to human performance.

Lord Moran, a British Army Officer, surgeon, and military theorist, wrote in 1945 on the effects of war on man and on how courage (will) is born and sustained.¹⁸ He suggests that the battlefield environment wears down an individual's capacity to act.¹⁹ To illustrate his argument, Moran uses a bank account metaphor. Before entering combat every person has a certain amount of will in his "bank account." The individual makes periodic "withdrawals" from his account to sustain himself in combat. Moran believes that anger, boredom, individual character, casualties, displays of courage, fatigue, fear, and stress are some of the factors that require an individual to make a withdrawal.²⁰ Each of these emotional responses and the degree to which they are displayed tie to the battlefield environment. Eventually, if the individual remains in combat long enough, he will diminish his account to a zero balance. Upon achieving a zero-balance, the individual is no longer effective. Moran also suggests that an individual can have his account replenished. In Moran's view, the quality of the soldier's leaders, the soldier's ideology, the presence of unit esprit de corps, the strength of unit discipline, and most importantly, the soldier's relationships with other soldiers (comraderie) are the means to replenish the individual soldier's account.²¹

Moran is arguing that although individual attributes are important in an individual's performance, ultimately the individual must rely on other soldiers to sustain an acceptable level of performance. In support of Moran's argument, other theorists offer the following views.

S. L. A. Marshall looks at individual performance in much the same light.²² Marshall believes that the primary group is the key to a soldier's maintaining an acceptable level of performance in combat.²³ Marshall also discusses the impact that feelings of isolation have on the individual soldier and points to the role of the primary group in providing the support necessary for the soldier to cope with this problem. Another military theorist, Anthony Kellest, supports the work of both Lord Moran and S. L. A. Marshall.

Anthony Kellest, a Canadian soldier and military theorist, published a multidimensional study in 1982 on the same problem that both Moran and Marshall address.²⁴ Instead of focusing on either the individual or the group, Kellest takes a holistic approach. His contribution is the connection he draws between the role of the primary group and the "identity" provided to the group from the greater organization. There is a reciprocal relationship between the individual, group, and organization.

Each, through demonstrated behavior, ensures the survival of the other.²⁵ From a leader's perspective, there are two problems in depending on primary groups in this type of relationship. Primary groups do not regenerate themselves without external assistance. Also, primary groups are less effective when the primary groups have a different identity or purpose than that of the greater organization. In short, the contribution Moran, Marshall, and Kellett make is identifying the primary group as the key to sustaining the individual will to fight. Therefore, the task for the tactical leader is twofold. The tactical leader must develop primary groups. Once he has formed primary groups, the tactical leader must then focus the behavior of the primary groups toward accomplishment of objectives that support the organization.

In Dr. Schneider's model the casualty measurement along the "Y" axis represents individuals, groups, and organizations. Therefore, the destructive process itself is the cause of the loss of the will to fight. The destructive process is an unchangeable battlefield condition. The leadership task under unchangeable battlefield conditions is to create, sustain, and regenerate primary groups as the means to maintain the will to fight. Since individuals make-up groups, the leadership process must take this into consideration.

Shamir Boas, a Professor of Sociology and Social Anthropology at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel, wrote on the dynamics of individual self-concept and motivation. Professor Boas makes five points in explaining his theory of individual self-concept and work motivation. People are not only goal-oriented but also self-expressive. People are motivated to maintain or enhance their self-esteem and self-worth. People are motivated to retain and increase their sense of self-consistency. Self-concepts are composed in part of identities. Self-concept based behavior is not always related to clear expectations or to immediate and specific goals.²⁶ In summarizing his argument Professor Boas said:

"People derive meaning from being linked to social collectives through their identities. Further, identities are expressed in activities that are congruent with the identity."²⁷

The crux of his argument, in a military sense, is that given the following four conditions, a tactical leader could enhance individual motivation: the job-related identities are salient in the person's self-concept; the job offers opportunities for self-esteem enhancement and for increased self-worth; job performance requires actions consistent with the person's self-concept; and career opportunities are congruent with the person's possible selves.²⁸

In other words, soldiers derive meaning from being associated with groups that both accept and reinforce their identities. By understanding that soldiers seek work that either reinforces or helps them to change their self-concept, the leader can create the conditions that influence soldier behavior. Therefore, the leadership challenge faced by the tactical level leader is to articulate the behavior he expects his soldiers to display and to create the conditions from which to support development of the desired behavior.

An examination of the battlefield environment from a theoretical perspective yields at least four leadership challenges. Army leaders need to develop a means to build, sustain, and regenerate cohesive organizations. Army leaders must also develop a C³ system that can focus small unit actions on the distributed battlefield. In addition, Army leaders must work toward creating and articulating an organizational self-concept that either reinforces or is congruent to that of the individual. Additionally, the Army approach must be holistic. It must develop individuals, groups, and organizations oriented toward a common objective. In developing a doctrine to do this, the Army will have provided a means to help tactical leaders to overcome the battlefield environment.

III. REVIEW OF DOCTRINE

Army leadership manuals form a hierarchy. That is, the manuals respectively address individuals, teams (groups), and organizations. Doctrinal publications developed as part of a hierarchy provide the means to look holistically at the existing leadership concepts.

The concept of developing the warrior spirit in both individuals and organizations is an absolute requirement for the Army's success in combat. However, before the Army can do this, its leadership doctrine at the individual and organizational levels must define and discuss how to develop the warrior spirit.

Field Manual 22-100 Military Leadership, addresses company grade officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, and junior leaders at the battalion level and below. It describes the warrior spirit with the following comments:

"...[the] will to fight and win. Some people call this 'winning spirit' or 'warrior spirit.' It is the ability to forge victory out of the chaos of battle--to overcome fear, hunger, deprivation, and fatigue. The soldier who can overcome these physical factors and continue to apply his skill and knowledge learned in training will ultimately have the ability to overcome any opponent in combat."²⁹

FM 22-100 states that the development of the warrior spirit depends on four things: the example the leader

sets; the attitudes he expresses; the expectations he establishes; and the standards he enforces.³⁰ In short, the manual describes the warrior spirit as the "will to win" developed through the leader's proper application of the principles of leadership and his integration of the BE-KNOW-DO leadership characteristics into an effective personal leadership style.³¹ In terms of building on the theoretical foundation, FM 22-100's contribution is the development of individual skills to form the basis for forming and leading teams.

Field Manual 22-102 Soldier Team Development, focuses on leaders at company level and below. This manual describes warrior spirit in the following narrative:

"When we try to determine the probable winner of a sports contest, we weigh the participant's strengths and weaknesses. We add them up and normally choose the strongest as the probable winner. But experience shows that this system does not always work. A team, outnumbered and overpowered, can overcome lack of strength and win when it has a strong desire to do so. That strong desire is called spirit--a most critical element of a combat ready-ready team. Soldiers in a unit with spirit believe in the cause for which they are fighting, they believe in themselves, and they fight for one another. They have a will to win and believe they are winners.³² "

FM 22-102 builds on the BE-KNOW-DO characteristics addressed in FM 22-100 and discusses how a leader can use them as the framework to guide unit members through

the stages of team development.³³ FM 22-102 echoes FM 22-100's description of warrior spirit again referring to it as the "will to win." In both manuals the development of the warrior spirit depends on the personal actions of the leader. Again, there is a reciprocal relationship. The actions of an individual (the leader) bear directly on the performance of the group. In addition, both manuals clearly articulate the behavior desired in soldiers.³⁴

Department of the Army Pamphlet 360-888 The Professional Development of Officers Study addresses the officer corps. The study states that officers with the warrior spirit act as follows:³⁵

"Officers accept the responsibility of being entrusted with the protection of the Nation; are prepared physically and mentally to lead units to fight and support in combat; [are] skilled in the use of weapons, tactics, and doctrine; inspire confidence and an eagerness to be a part of the team; have the ability to analyze, the vision to see, the integrity to choose, and the courage to execute."³⁶

DA PAM 360-888 states that the Army will develop the warrior spirit in officers through the following five actions. The Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) education system's common core curricula will include blocks of instruction and readings about professionalism and warrior spirit. The TRADOC schools will systematically and progressively stress confidence and competence in basic tactics, current doctrine, and

weapons employment. The Army will provide officers with the opportunity to participate in challenging and stressful training experiences (e.g., Airborne, Air Assault, and Ranger Schools). Officers will continue to undergo semiannual physical fitness readiness testing. Officers will qualify annually with their individual weapons.³⁷ DA PAM 360-888, though not a doctrinal publication, has made a significant contribution toward the development of the warrior spirit within the officer corps by affecting the Army's institutional approach to officer development.³⁸ Implicit in the payoff from the success of DA PAM 360-888's recommended institutional approach is the development of skills that complement those discussed in FM 22-100 and FM 22-102. Between all of the manuals previously discussed, there exists a certain degree of mutual support. However, the mutual support begins to break down when one looks at the doctrine directed at those concerned with leading large (battalion size or greater) organizations.

The last doctrinal publication that addresses warrior spirit is Field Manual 22-103 Leadership and Command at Senior Levels. FM 22-103 does not define warrior spirit. Instead, it implies that warrior spirit is the creative, innovative, risk-taking behavior displayed in a senior leader's subordinates.

The manual suggests that a senior leader develop this type of behavior by resolving the conflict between leading and managing.³⁹ FM 22-103 further states that "Professional excellence is anchored in a warrior spirit developed through emphasis on: distinctive appearance; rigorous training; high performance standards; unit importance; and rites of passage."⁴⁰ The meaning of warrior spirit in the context of FM 22-103's argument could take one of several forms. The manual could be implying that warrior spirit is creative, innovative, risk-taking behavior or professional excellence or a combination of the two. The methods to develop warrior spirit could be the resolution of the conflict between leading and managing or working within the framework prescribed by the factors mentioned above or a combination of the two.

The Army's doctrinal leadership manuals focus on developing the warrior spirit in individuals, teams, officers, and units. However, the inconsistencies in defining or describing the warrior spirit causes one to question the manuals' recommended approaches.

Thus far, the discussion has focused on the theoretical and doctrinal elements of leadership as related to defining and developing the warrior spirit. The previous discussion laid the foundation from which to develop a "straw-man" definition for warrior spirit.

The following definition emerges from the synthesis of the theoretical and doctrinal concepts previously discussed:

The psychological perspective present in individuals, groups, organizations, and institutions that underpins the will to fight, the willingness to take calculated risks, and a commitment to duty exhibited through actions directed toward mission accomplishment regardless of the odds or conditions.

IV. HISTORICAL VIGNETTES

Armed with a "straw-man" definition and the preceding discussion, this chapter continues by discussing historical examples where a leader's actions influenced the development of the warrior spirit. The intent in each case is not to narrate details, but to address those aspects that bear directly on a discussion of warrior spirit.

Major General Terry de la Mesa Allen, Commander of the First Infantry Division in North Africa and Italy in World War II, used several techniques to develop the warrior spirit in his unit.⁴¹ History records that the First Infantry Division when employed intact never lost a round of combat during the North African and Sicilian Campaigns.⁴² The actions taken by General Allen are among the chief reasons for the First Infantry Division

remaining a cohesive, effective fighting force throughout the war.

General Allen assumed command at Camp Blanding, Florida in 1942 as the Division trained for overseas deployment.⁴³ One of his first actions was to emphasize to his soldiers the heritage, traditions, and responsibilities each man assumed upon joining the Division. This action had the effect of laying the foundation for an organizational self-concept rooted to the Division's past. By linking the soldiers to the Division's historical reputation for excellence, General Allen gave each man a benchmark from which to measure their performance. Emphasizing a unit identity tied to past unit history also serves as a means to foster vertical and horizontal cohesion between members of the organization.

General Allen's next action occurred following the Division's amphibious assault near Oran, Algeria on 8 November 1942.⁴⁴ In a conversation with his chief of staff, General Allen coined a phrase that would later become the Division's slogan.⁴⁵ When asked, just before the Division attacked, if he had any instructions for the units, General Allen answered by saying "Nothing in H--- must delay or stop the attack."⁴⁶ General Allen's phrase underwent slight revision to read "Nothing in H--- must stop the

First Division."⁴⁷ The slogan captured the essence of the mental attitude General Allen wanted within the Division. Developing distinctive slogans or mottos further enhances cohesion by strengthening or reinforcing the organization's identity. The development of a unit distinctive slogan also promotes esprit de corps.

Upon reaching Oran, the Division spent the next few months preparing for the Sicily invasion. During this period the Division had some of its units stripped away to support combat operations in Tunisia. In return, the Division received attachment of some British and French units.⁴⁸ General Allen's action in this instance was to complain to his higher headquarters. Unfortunately, General Eisenhower's tactical priorities prevented resolution of this issue.⁴⁹ The practice of shifting units from one organization (task-organizing) to another breaks down unit cohesion. For a unit to function effectively when separated from the larger organization, the unit should have an individual identity besides the shared identity of the larger organization. The other challenge created by the process of task-organizing is that the receiving tactical commander must lead troops who could sometimes have an organizational identity rooted in values and principles that are not congruent to

his own. One solution to this problem is to develop an institutional level self-concept or identity that contains values and principles common to all units. In terms of coalition warfare, the value of having a shared organizational self-concept depends on the size of the force undergoing task organization; the smaller the force, the more important that it has a solid organizational concept.

Major General George S. Patton Jr., took command of II Corps, the First Infantry Division's parent headquarters, on 6 March 1943.⁵⁰ Upon assuming command, General Patton issued the famous necktie-and-helmet-at-all-times policy as a means to improve discipline throughout II Corps.⁵¹ General Allen did not support this policy but instead allowed the First Infantry Division to maintain a uniform different from the other II Corps units. In doing so, the First Infantry Division further solidified its own organizational identity.⁵² General Allen's decision to not follow the higher headquarters' order raises several discipline issues. Of particular interest is General Allen's view of discipline. The essence of his thought is that discipline should contribute toward the functioning of units in combat. General Allen did not create or support policies that did not make a material contribution to the conduct of combat operations.⁵³

The First Infantry Division reunited in Morsott, Algeria in March of 1943 for a general rest and refit period. General Allen used this time to establish the "Battle School" for incoming replacements.⁵⁴ The school's training program included instruction on traditions of the division, weapons, patrolling, night combat operations, physical conditioning, and first aid. As a result of this school, the Division increased its level of combat efficiency, had fewer casualties, and increased morale among the new replacements. Establishment of the "Battle School" served several purposes. The school fostered the development of individual identification with the organization. The school served as a rite of passage for incoming replacements. Graduation from the "Battle School" was a requirement to be part of the First Infantry Division team. The school's rigorous training program prepared the soldier for combat, provided him with a sense of achievement, and gave him a source of commonality with other soldiers in the division. Attendance at the "Battle School" gave the soldier an opportunity to learn about his unit and the importance of the Division's mission. The school allowed for informal exchanges between the cadre (combat veterans) and the replacements. The opportunity to pass on "war stories" and other philosophical discussions further

enhanced the significance of being a member of the team. Attendance at the school allowed the replacements to begin forming small, cohesive groups. From these small groups, the nucleus was in place from which to build larger groups (i.e., squads). The school allowed the noncommissioned officer corps to apply their combat experiences in preparing the school's curriculum. In doing so, the Division ensured that the new soldiers could benefit from the veterans' experience. Between the synergistic effect of the Battle School program and other actions taken by General Allen, the First Infantry Division developed a very distinct attitude. Some have called it cocky, aggressive, and even arrogant.⁵⁵ However, few would dispute the fact that the First Infantry Division was an effective combat organization in the early part of the North African Campaign. The Division would sustain a high level of performance during the second part of the North African campaign.

The review of theory discussed the importance of creating a command and control system that could focus the effort of numerous small elements on the distributed battlefield. The requirement to do this led to the creation of staffs through which the commander could exercise command. The relationship between the commander and staff is very important,

especially at the higher levels. One of the realities of the distributed battlefield is that the commander cannot grasp the entire situation without assistance from his staff. The commander also relies on his staff to take action as needed in his absence. Therefore, the commander and staff must be of like mind in terms of exercising command functions. General Allen's relationship with his staff during the latter part of the North African Campaign is a good illustration of this concept in practice.

The First Infantry Division conducted a successful night attack on objectives north of Gafsa on 16-17 March 1943.⁵⁶ Much of the credit for the success in this operation is due to excellent work by General Allen's staff and his relationship with them. General Allen believed that the place for the commander was at the critical point of action. The implication is that General Allen would not be available to work with the staff for extended periods of time. To compensate for his absence, General Allen imbued his staff with what he called "cavalry style--that is--quick orders, tell somebody to do something, maybe duplicate effort, but go, go, go."⁵⁷ General Allen believed that he should tell the staff what he wanted to do, not how. The decentralized manner in which the staff operated was the key to taking advantage of opportunities on the

distributed battlefield. By showing confidence in his staff and allowing them to work with minimal guidance, General Allen ensured that the staff could display the same aggressive behavior he expected in his other soldiers. A side-benefit to the decentralized approach in working with the staff is that staff morale remained high throughout the remainder of the campaign. The manner in which General Allen worked with his staff reinforces that not only must the commander lead his unit but that he must also lead his staff. General Allen's layered approach to leadership firmly established an organizational identity throughout the division. However, there are times when an organization's identity becomes a problem.

After completion of the fighting in Tunisia the Division moved back to the Oran area for rest and relaxation. Upon arrival in Oran, soldiers of the First Infantry Division found that clubs and other facilities had been placed off-limits to them by the II Corps headquarters.⁵⁸ This had the effect of creating open hostilities between the First Infantry Division soldiers and the rear-echelon troops. General Bradley, commander of II Corps, said:

Thus the woolen uniform in Oran became the unmistakable badge of troops from the Tunisian Front. As long as bands of the 1st Division hunted-down khaki-clad service troops in Oran, those sweaty woolens were the only assurance of safe conduct in the city's

streets. . . . It also indicated a serious breakdown in discipline with the division. Allen's troops had now begun to strut their toughness while ignoring regulations that applied to all other units.⁵⁹

General Bradley's comments affirm the degree to which the soldiers of the First Infantry Division had become a cohesive fighting force. Their identity as members of the "Big Red One" had firm roots in their distinctive appearance and shared experiences. The foundation laid by General Allen would allow the First Infantry Division to remain a cohesive fighting force throughout the remainder of the war, as the invasion of Sicily clearly demonstrates.

The First Infantry Division conducted an amphibious assault onto the island of Sicily on the morning of 10 July 1943. The initial assault forces encountered light enemy resistance. Enemy air strikes and rough seas delayed the arrival of supporting artillery and armor. By the afternoon of 10 July, three battalions of artillery were ashore, despite having suffered high personnel and equipment losses.⁶⁰ Enemy opposition stiffened throughout the day and into the night. By late evening, the First Infantry Division realized that it had encountered a significant enemy force.

On the morning of 11 July, sixty tanks of the Herman Goering Panzer Division penetrated the First

Infantry Division. Without armor support, the Division's infantry allowed themselves to be overrun by enemy tanks. After allowing the German tanks to pass through, the Division's infantry were able to stop the German infantry which had accompanied the tanks. General Allen placed his artillery units between the Division's rear area along the beach and the advancing German tanks. The artillery units firing from direct fire positions and supported by naval gunfire were able to stop the German attack. The Germans attempted another counterattack later in the day using less armor. The Division was able to stop this attack as well.⁶¹

On 11 July 1943, General Allen received information that German reinforcements were occupying assembly areas in front of the First Infantry Division.⁶² From this information he deduced that the Germans were preparing for an attack, more than likely on the morning of 12 July 1943. General Allen believed that "this situation necessitated immediate positive action by the First Division."⁶³ General Allen issued orders that the Division would attack at midnight. Division artillery and naval gunfire preparatory fires preceded the First Division's attack. The First Infantry Division attack surprised the Germans and by

the following morning the Division had seized all objectives.⁶⁴ General Allen's action demonstrated the creative, risk taking behavior discussed in FM 22-103. That the Division remained a cohesive force despite facing significant odds is ample testimony of the quality of General Allen's leadership and the degree to which he fostered the development of warrior spirit in his organization. The following quotation explains General Allen's leadership philosophy, the intent behind his actions and the essence of building the will to fight:

"The average American soldier is a self thinking individual with basic motives of patriotism and love of country. But, once his own unit is committed to battle, his most urgent incentive is the fact that he is fighting for his unit. When American soldiers are imbued with an intense belief in their outfit, they will never let their units down regardless of their fatigue or battle weariness. They wear their division insignia with a fierce pride and will fight for their outfit at the drop of a hat. Units that have this pride of accomplishment have a cocky self-assurance, all their own, which pays off in battle."⁶⁵

The First Infantry Division continued to fight successfully throughout the remainder of the Sicilian Campaign. The most brutal fighting during the campaign occurred in the battle for the town of Troina. After six days of continuous fighting in which the Germans counterattacked twenty-four times, the First

Division captured the town of Troina.⁶⁶ Immediately following the battle of Troina, Major General Clarence R. Huebner replaced General Allen as the Division's commander.⁶⁷

General Huebner faced a different challenge than General Allen. Whereas General Allen had to create the will to fight, General Huebner's task was to sustain the First Infantry Division's will to fight.⁶⁸ The next historical vignette describes the actions taken by General Huebner to sustain the Division's will to fight throughout the remainder of the Sicilian and in the initial days of the Normandy Campaigns.

One of the means by which General Huebner sustained the will to fight was to improve discipline within the Division. General Huebner began by setting the standard for leading by example. He made a point of personally instructing his chief of staff, division artillery commander, regimental commander, and commander of special troops on the proper methods for saluting and conducting close-order drill.⁶⁹ General Huebner accomplished several purposes through this action. He set the standard for leading by example throughout the Division and communicated his expectations and performance standards to his subordinates. General Huebner was additionally able to measure the effectiveness of the Division's chain-of-

command in passing information from the division down to the squad level.

Taking action again, General Huebner directed the staff to rigidly adhere to the provisions of Field Manual 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations.⁷⁰ General Huebner would continue to allow the staff to operate decentralized. However, by making them adhere to the doctrinal staff procedures in FM 101-5, he would improve their effectiveness. General Huebner's action in dealing with his staff should serve as a reminder that the commander must not only train his soldiers, but also his staff.

Upon completion of the fighting in the Troina area, the First Division returned to Gela, Sicily, for additional training and rest.⁷¹ During this period General Huebner sought to improve the quality of rifle marksmanship within the Division.⁷² General Huebner had received information from his staff which indicated that the infantry over-relied on their supporting artillery. Further analysis revealed that over 2,000 men had not qualified with their weapons since the Division left North Africa.⁷³ To correct the problem, General Huebner personally led the division's rifle marksmanship program. General Allen also expected each leader down to squad level to personally instruct their subordinates in rifle marksmanship. General Huebner's

action reinforced the importance that he placed on leading by example. The result is that the officers and noncommissioned officers took an immediate interest in the training of their men and individual confidence in the use of personal weapons increased. The chain-of-command's emphasis on rifle marksmanship served other purposes. Leaders at each level of command could instill confidence in their subordinates by demonstrating tactical and technical proficiency when presenting instruction. Leaders at each level of command could establish and enforce training standards expected from their next lower level. In turn, soldiers could observe the type of behavior they would have to exhibit upon becoming noncommissioned officers and officers.

General Huebner also made rifle marksmanship a rite of passage for infantrymen within the Division. His policy was that any infantrymen who could not shoot at the expert level could not serve in a rifle platoon. General Huebner's policy had the effect of making assignment to a rifle platoon the most sought after position within the Division.⁷⁴ By making assignment to a rifle platoon something that the soldier must earn, General Huebner increased the morale of those already serving in the coveted position. Those soldiers who could qualify as expert and get assigned

to a rifle platoon were more readily accepted by the soldiers already in the unit, thus improving cohesion and fostering the development of teams.

General Huebner continued with his rigorous training program until the time the Division began preparing to participate in the Normandy invasion. The Division would be among the first units to land on Omaha Beach during the invasion. General Huebner sought a means to provide for continuous command and control given that units can quickly lose orientation following an amphibious landing. To that end, General Huebner had each infantry battalion commander memorize the missions of the other infantry battalions participating in the operation.⁷⁵ His intent was to provide the maximum amount of flexibility in executing combat operations under decentralized conditions. His action had the effect of reducing uncertainty between the units that would ultimately participate in the operation.

Another of General Huebner's methods to sustain the will to fight was to reward acts of heroism on the spot. To do this, he carried around various awards that he could present upon encountering deserving individuals. The burden for submitting the paperwork to support the award fell to the awarded soldier's unit.⁷⁶ Similarly, General Huebner wanted to improve

the aggressiveness of his troops. His policy was that he would award the Silver Star to any man who killed a tank with a bazooka.⁷⁷ In rewarding performance immediately, General Huebner increased morale down to the individual level.

On D-Day, 6 June 1944, the First Infantry Division landed in the initial assault wave onto Omaha Beach. The Division met strong opposition as they tried to cross 300 meters of open beach. Initial intelligence reports showed that the Division would face a defending German regiment. By chance, the German mobile 352d Division, on training maneuvers, had reinforced the regiment defending the beach.⁷⁸ In doing this, the German's defense significantly reduced the tempo of the First Division's attack. From his floating command post General Huebner attempted to monitor the battle. For the most part, he was unable to establish radio contact with units ashore. Eventually, he decided to come ashore and observe the battle for himself. Upon arriving ashore General Huebner took control of the situation. He established radio contact with each of his regimental commanders and to add momentum to the battle he committed his reserve regiment. Slowly, the Division moved inland, eventually overcoming the defending forces. Of the Division's performance, a war correspondent wrote:

"In all its battles in Africa, Sicily, France, Belgium, and Germany, there never was one quite like the battle at Omaha Beach. In that battle alone the Fighting First won a niche among the immortals of American history. Huebner's men smashed the main strength of the Germans and by doing so turned the key that unlocked the door to victory in Europe."⁷⁹

Despite suffering high casualties, the Division sustained the will to fight and successfully completed this operation. Under General Huebner's leadership, the First Infantry Division remained an effective fighting force for the remainder of 1944.

V. ANALYSIS, CONCLUSIONS, and RECOMMENDATIONS

Evaluation of General Allen's actions against the "straw-man" definition shows that the warrior spirit was a key factor in allowing the First Infantry Division to withstand the process of destruction during World War II. General Allen created a psychological perspective (attitude) in his Division that sustained the will to fight. He created this psychological perspective by creating an organizational identity and self-concept rooted to the Division's history. He also created a division slogan that imbued the Division with an offensive-minded spirit. General Allen enhanced the organization's identity by having the division adopt an appearance different from the rest of the corps.

General Allen sustained the will to fight and the commitment to duty by building, sustaining, and regenerating cohesive organizations. He was able to build and sustain vertical and horizontal cohesion through the development of an organizational identity. Creation of the "Battle School" allowed General Allen to regenerate cohesion upon the unit's subjection to the destructive forces of combat. The Division reflected a commitment to duty through sustained performance excellence in combat. General Allen nurtured creative, innovative, risk taking behavior in the Division. He achieved this through training his staff to operate decentralized.

Evaluation of General Huebner's actions against the "straw-man" definition also proves favorable. General Huebner worked hard to sustain the Division's warrior spirit created by his predecessor. He sustained the Division's will to fight by leaving intact several initiatives established by General Allen. He also sustained the will to fight through improving the effectiveness of the chain-of-command in leading the Division's units at all levels. General Huebner improved the Division's ability to take calculated risks through training and awards. General Huebner trained the staff on the use of standard doctrinal procedures while continuing to let them

operate decentralized. He also articulated and rewarded the type of aggressive behavior he wanted within the Division. General Huebner sustained the Division's commitment to duty by placing emphasis on leading by example. Leaders at all levels became more actively involved in training their soldiers for combat and positions of increased responsibility.

Though different in thought and manner, both General Allen and General Huebner were effective. What becomes readily apparent is not the importance of personality in developing the warrior spirit, but the importance of actions a leader takes to create the warrior spirit. In short, actions that a leader can take to develop organizational identity, to promote unit cohesion, to decentralize command and control, and lead by example are the keys to developing the warrior spirit.

Tactical level leaders can affect the development of the warrior spirit within their units. For a leader interested in developing the warrior spirit in his unit, Army leadership doctrine would be a good place to start. Army leadership doctrine is valid in terms of describing actions that tactical leaders can take to develop the warrior spirit. However, Army doctrine requires a common definition for warrior spirit in order to make the doctrine holistic and mutually

supportive. The Army's adoption of the following definition for warrior spirit would make the leadership doctrine holistic and mutually supportive:

Warrior spirit is the psychological perspective present in individuals, groups, organizations, and institutions that underpins the will to fight, the willingness to take calculated risks, and a commitment to duty exhibited through actions directed toward mission accomplishment regardless of the odds or conditions.

The implication from adopting the above definition is slight. The doctrinal publications discussed earlier would require the addition of the new definition. Upon including the new definition in doctrine, the Army will provide a single comprehensive focus for leader development Army-wide.

ENDNOTES

¹United States Army, Field Manual 22-103: Leadership and Command at Senior Levels (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1987), p. 45.

²The third chapter of the monograph discusses the doctrinal inconsistency in detail. In short, of the four leadership manuals, none uniformly defines or describes warrior spirit. For example: Field Manual 22-100, Military Leadership, defines the warrior spirit as the will to fight and win. FM 22-102, Soldier Team Development, describes the warrior spirit as an intense desire to win. Department of the Army Pamphlet 360-888, Commanders Call Special Issue: The Professional Development of Officers Study, describes the behavior associated with the warrior spirit but does not define warrior spirit. FM 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels, implies that warrior spirit could be on or two different concepts. However, the manual does not come to closure by deciding on which of the two descriptions is the basis for the doctrine.

³Henry B. Wolf, Ed., Websters New Collegiate Dictionary (Mass: G & C Merriam and Co., 1975), p. 295.

⁴Carl von Clausewitz, On War, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 186, 231. Clausewitz was the son of a retired Prussian Army officer. He entered the Prussian Army as a cadet at the age of 12 in 1780. One year later Clausewitz fought in the War of the First Coalition against France, 1793-1794. It was during this war that he received his officer's commission. In 1803, Clausewitz graduated from the top of his class at the Military School of Berlin. He then became the Aide to Prince August of Prussia. Clausewitz fought again in 1806 in the Jena Campaign where he was captured by the French. After the war, Clausewitz assisted in the reorganization of the Prussian Army. He also taught at the Prussian Military School and was assigned as the Military Instructor of Frederick William IV, Crown Prince of Prussia. In 1812 Prussia aligned with France against the Russians. Clausewitz saw this as traitorous and as a result resigned his commission to join the Russian Army. He served with the rear guard covering the Russian retreat and later in the pursuit of Napoleon. He served as a liaison officer during the campaign of 1813 and Corps Chief of Staff during 1814. Clausewitz reentered the Prussian Army in 1815. In the Waterloo Campaign of 1815, Clausewitz served as Corps Chief of Staff.

Clausewitz did most of his writing from 1815-1830 while a Major General and Director of Administration at the Prussian War School. He stopped writing in 1830 upon his transfer to the artillery and assignment as Army Chief of Staff. He died in 1831 at the age of 51.

His major writings consisted of seven books published by his widow after his death. These books are: ON War, The Italian Campaign (1796-1797), The Campaigns of Switzerland and Italy, 1799, The Wars of 1812, 1813, and 1814, The Waterloo Campaign, and two volumes describing several campaigns conducted by leading generals and strategists.

His most important work has been On War. In it, Clausewitz developed his theory of war. On War concerns strategy at the strategic and operational levels.

⁵William J. Wansley, "American Spirit: A Leadership Philosophy for U.S. Tactical Forces, (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1991), p. 6; James J. Schneider, "The Theory of the Empty Battlefield," Journal of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) for Defence Studies, (September, 1987), pp. 6-9.

⁶Schneider, "Theory of the Empty Battlefield," (Journal of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) for Defence Studies, September, 1987), p. 6

⁷Ibid, p. 9.

⁸Ibid, p.37

⁹Ivan S. Jean de Bloch, The Future of War, (Boston: The World Peace Foundation, 1914), p. xxvii; Christopher Bellamy, The Future of Land Warfare (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), pp. 274-275.

¹⁰Ardant Du Picq, Battle Studies, (Harrisburg, 1987), p. 72. Colonel Ardant Du Picq was a career French Army officer and military theorist who was well-qualified to write about the human dimension in war in Battle Studies. He was born in 1831 and commissioned a sub-lieutenant after graduating from Saint-Cyr in 1844. He died as a colonel in 1870 from wounds received while leading his regiment in the Battle of Borny during the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871). His other major combat experiences were the Crimean War (1853-1856) where he was captured and held for three months and the Syrian Campaign (1860-1861).

Du Picq's purpose for writing Battle Studies was to instruct the French officer corps on the key element in war. He states "Nothing can be wisely prescribed in

an army . . . without exact knowledge of the fundamental instrument, man, and his state of mind, his morale, at the instant of combat (p. 65). Du Picq believed that through instruction based on historical analysis of human performance in battle he could educate, mature, and inspire the next generation of French Officers.

Du Picq used historical examples and personal experiences (his and others) to discuss a variety of major ideas on the human dimension in war, especially on the topic of cohesion. For example, he used the Battle of Cannae to show that cohesion, when present on one side and lacking on the other allows a small force to defeat a much larger one (Hannibal attacked with a force of 36,000 and defeated the Roman force of 70,000). Du Picq started his argument by explaining how man will take extraordinary steps to avoid getting killed and that the instinct for self-preservation is so strong that without some way to overcome this instinct there could be no unity of effort. Du Picq then offered a solution for overcoming fear. He stated "Discipline has for its aim the domination of that instinct by a great terror" (p. 77). Du Picq believed discipline could help man overcome the fear of death. He also stated that discipline has limitations and that something else is needed to induce men to fight in the face of death. Du Picq then offered the solution of cohesion. He believed that when all else fails men will fight for each other. This is why the wise leader should take steps to create an environment where soldiers bond with their comrades. He showed how Hannibal employed forms of cross-training and maintenance of unit integrity to keep his multi-ethnic force unified. Du Picq concluded by showing the chain of events surrounding the collapse of cohesion. He demonstrated how Hannibal's strategy of isolating the Roman forces reduced their unit cohesion and then caused a breakdown in discipline which enabled Hannibal to defeat the much larger force.

¹¹Ibid, p. 72.

¹²Ibid, pp. 71-72.

¹³Ibid, p. 73.

¹⁴Martin Van Creveld, Command in War, (Massachusetts, 1985), p.1. Martin Van Creveld is an internationally renowned military historian. He has no military background, but has been an observer of modern warfare, to include several of the Middle East wars, the Vietnam War, and the war in Afghanistan. He received a PhD

from the London School of Economics. He is also a Fellow of War Studies at Kings College, Cambridge. He has also taught and lectured at the United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College in the period 1991-1992.

He is a prolific writer who applied Hans Delbruck methods of Sachkritik to modern warfare to assess the relevance of traditional ways of thinking about warfare. His study of the factors leading to success in battle throughout history formed the basis for Fighting Power: German Military Performance, 1914-1945, and Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945, a striking comparison of the masters of the profession with the amateurs who did them in. He wrote Military Lessons of the YoM Kippur War: Historical Perspectives in 1975. In this work he discusses the tremendous lethality on the modern battlefield. He suggests that the defense is the dominant form of battle. The implications of this realization is a return to longer and more total wars. He also concludes that modern warfare reinforces the importance of the relationship between society and the military. As with the U.S. experience in Vietnam, the Middle East experience showed that a nation cannot win a war with just its military arm--it must have the support of the totality of society. Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, written in 1977, is an in-depth look at the importance of logistics to warfare--in fact it is the most critical leg of warfare according to Van Crevelde. Command in War, written in 1985, outlines the development of command since ancient Greeks. Van Crevelde discusses the importance of commanding, staff organization, communications, weaponry, and logistics, in not only theory, but practice, through an in-depth study of many battles. One of his important conclusions, is that while technology brought on many new possibilities, it has brought new limitations as well.

¹⁵Ibid, p. 9.

¹⁶Ibid, p. 9.

¹⁷S. L. A. Marshall, Men Under Fire, (New York: William Morrow & Co.,), p. 23.

¹⁸Blake, Lord and C. S. Nichols, Eds, Dictionary of National Biography, 1971-1980, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 913-914. Lord Moran was born Charles McMoran Wilson at Skipton in Craven, Yorkshire, on 10 November 1882. Educated in London, Lord Moran entered St. Mary's Medical School in 1902

and graduated as a medical doctor with honors in 1913. His first position was as the medical registrar of St. Mary's Hospital.

When England entered the World War I, Lord Moran enlisted in the Royal Army Medical Corps and was assigned to the 1st Battalion of the Royal Fusiliers. He spent two years on the front lines and was drastically affected by the horrors and heroism of trench warfare. He was awarded the Military Cross in 1916 for bravery during the battle of the Somme, as well as the Italian silver medal. Moran ended his service in the war with the rank of major.

During his years on the front line Moran kept a diary chronicling the stresses affecting soldiers. This diary inspired him to write the Anatomy of Courage in 1945. This work described how courage could either become strengthened or spent in combat. For many years Moran lectured at the British Army Staff College at Camberley on how courage and fear affected soldiers.

¹⁹Lord Moran, The Anatomy of Courage, (New York: Avery, 1945) pp. xvi, 17, 64.

²⁰Ibid, pp. 62, 64, 69, 81, 102, 146.

²¹Ibid, pp. 156, 162, 174, 180.

²²Roger J. Spiller, Ed., Dictionary of American Military Biography, (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1984), pp. 737-741. Samuel Lyman Atwood Marshall born in Catskill, New York, on 18 July 1900, was a military writer, journalist and Army officer who pioneered combat history techniques in during World War II.

Marshall enlisted in the Army in 1917 and saw combat in World War I while assigned to the 90th Division fighting at Soissons, St. Mihiel, the Meuse-Argonne, and Ypres-Lys. In 1919, while still in France, he was commissioned as an infantry lieutenant.

In the period between 1922 and 1940 Marshall worked as a journalist for various news organizations. During this period Marshall opened a correspondence with J.F.C. Fuller. Fuller strongly influenced Marshall's views on the future of mechanized war. Marshall captured the ideas in his first book Blitzkrieg. Publication of this book brought Marshall to the attention of Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of War.

Marshall initially worked for Stimson as major assigned to the Office of War Information. Later, Marshall joined the historical service. Now a Lieutenant Colonel, Marshall observed and reported on several battles. During one of these he noted that no two soldiers could offer the same view of the battle.

Intrigued, Marshall began to investigate in detail the dynamics of tactical operations, a subject that became his life's work.

In 1946 Marshall wrote Men Against Fire to provide an account of all that he had learned in war. His experiences taught him that the soldier is ill prepared for what awaits him on the battlefield, despite the training he may have had. He concluded that the gap between the soldier's training and the soldier's battle meant that fewer than 25% of all infantrymen ever fired their weapons in combat. The crux of the solution is in the degree to which soldiers could band together, forming groups for mutual survival. Marshall noted that where soldiers were close to one another, for example in a tank crew, artillery piece, or machinegun, their performance was not a problem. From this observation Marshall deduced that the proximity of comrades allowed the soldier to withstand the horrors of war.

Marshall continued to write on military subjects. His writings cover the Korean War, the Arab-Israeli War, and the Vietnam War. He died in El Paso in 1977.

²³Marshall, Men Under Fire, pp. 42, 123-124, 149, 161, 170. S.L.A. Marshall believes that ". . . one of the simplest truths of war that the thing which enables an infantry soldier to keep going with his weapons is the near presence or presumed near presence of a comrade." Therefore, the formation of a group tends to improve the individual's chance for survival. Once formed, the primary group exists as long as needed to support the needs of the members.

²⁴Anthony Kellet, Combat Motivation, (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, 1982), pp. 19-58, 79-117, 133-163, 217-269. Anthony Kellet is a Canadian who has served for a period of time with the Royal Canadian Hussars. The book, Combat Motivation, is based largely on a study prepared for the Canadian Department of National Defence and published in 1980. The purpose of the study was to review the subject of combat motivation for the purpose of improving the leadership, administration, and training of the Canadian armed forces. The result is a mixture of behavioral science and military history. The examples are taken largely from the Twentieth century's wars and from British, Canadian, and American actions in particular.

At one time or another during their careers, most military commanders speculate about what motivates their men to fight. George Washington, for example, wrote to the Congress that, "Three things prompt men to a regular discharge of their duty in time of action:

natural bravery, hope of reward, and fear of punishment." Other military writers such as Ardant Du Picq and S.L.A. Marshall have maintained that soldiers are motivated primarily by feelings of comradeship.

Speculations as to what motivates men to fight and a variety of other aspects of motivation are covered in Combat Motivation. Since much of the book goes well beyond what a behavioral scientist would call motivation, the book's subtitle, The Behavior of Men in Battle, is actually a more accurate description of the contents than the title itself. There are, for example, sections on training, military discipline, organizational policies such as troop rotation and descriptions of combat in addition to discussions of such standard motivators as patriotism, religious beliefs, punishments, and rewards.

²⁵Ibid, pp. 97, 100, 102, 103, 104. Kellet's argument mirrors that of S.L.A. Marshall. Kellet states that the moral support provided by the group has been a feature of both close-order and open-order warfare and, quoting S.L.A. Marshall, that "one of the simplest truths of war that the thing which enables an infantry soldier to keep going with his weapons is the near presence or presumed near presence of a comrade. The point Kellet makes is that groups are made up of individuals. The reason why individuals form groups is for comradeship, group solidarity, mutual risk, and leadership. Therefore, individuals join for their own survival and once the group is formed, the purpose of the group is to ensure the survival of the members.

²⁶Boas Shamir, "Meaning, Self and Motivation in Organizations," Organization Studies, (1991), p. 411.

²⁷Ibid, p. 413.

²⁸Ibid, p. 416.

²⁹U.S. Army, Field Manual 22-100, Military Leadership, (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1983), p. 54.

³⁰Ibid, p. 54.

³¹U.S. Army, Field Manual 22-100, Military Leadership, p. 53. The BE-KNOW-DO leadership framework is the means by which the Army stresses those things that a leader must BE (a person of strong and honorable character; committed to the professional Army ethic; an example of individual values; and able to resolve complex ethical dilemmas), those things a leader must

KNOW (the four factors of leadership and how they affect each other; standards; yourself; human nature; your job; your unit), and those things a leader must DO (provide purpose; provide direction; and provide motivation).

³²U.S. Army, Field Manual 22-102, Soldier Team Development, (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1987), p. 2.

³³Ibid, p. iv.

³⁴See discussion in notes 23 and 25.

³⁵Department of the Army, Pamphlet 360-888, Commanders Call Special Issue: The Professional Development of Officers Study, (Washington DC, 1985), p. 5. This publication uses the term "warrior spirit," but nowhere in the manual is there a clear definition for warrior spirit.

³⁶Ibid, p. 5.

³⁷Ibid, p.17

³⁸Ibid, pp. 8, 14-24. On 2 May 1985, the Army Chief of Staff received an assessment by the Army Staff of 116 base policies and supporting actions recommended by the Professional Development of Officers Study Group. The Army Chief of Staff approved in principle the implementation of all base policies (p. 14-24) subject, in some cases, to an identification of resource requirements and or review of specific issues. The effect of these initiatives has been a restructuring of the officer development process Army-wide.

³⁹U.S. Army, Field Manual 22-103, Leadership and Command At Senior Levels, (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1987), p. 43.

⁴⁰Ibid, p. 55.

⁴¹Spiller, p. 23. Terry de la Mesa Allen was born 1 April 1888 at Fort Douglas Utah. His father was a career Army officer and his maternal grandfather a Spanish Colonel who fought for the North during the U.S. Civil War. He entered West Point in 1907 and remained there for five years. After failing gunnery in his fifth year he transferred to Catholic University of America and graduated in 1912. On 30 November 1912, he was commissioned a second-lieutenant in the cavalry. For most of the time until World War I, he served in

the Southwest along the Mexican border and was involved in several skirmishes.

During World War I, he transferred to the Infantry where he commanded the 3d Battalion of the 358th Infantry, 90th Division. He was wounded in action three times while leading his units in several battles that earned him a reputation as an aggressive leader. He returned to the U.S. following the war. He graduated from the Command and General Staff School in 1926 and the Army War College in 1935.

He was promoted to brigadier general in 1940 without ever having been a colonel. He was promoted to Major General in 1942. With this promotion came his assignment to the First Infantry Division which he led in the North Africa Campaign and in the invasion of Sicily. Following the attack on Troina, Sicily, in September of 1943, Allen was relieved of command by General Bradley, the II Corps Commander. General Bradley stated "...by now Allen had become too much of an individualist to submerge himself without friction in the group undertakings of war. The 1st Division, under Allen's command, had become too full of self-pity and pride. To save Allen both from himself and from his brilliant record and to save the Division from too much success [emphasis added], I decided to separate them" (p. 24). Following his relief, General Allen returned to the United States where he took command of the 104th Infantry Division.

He fought the 104th Division in Europe from September of 1944 to April of 1945. Allen became the only general in World War II to lead a second division into combat after being relieved of command. Allen retired as a Major General in 1946. He died in El Paso, Texas in 1969.

⁴²Terry de la Mesa Allen, "Situation and Operations Report of the First Infantry Division During the Period of Its Overseas Movement, North African and Sicilian Campaigns, from 8 August 1942 to 7 August 1943." (Unpublished paper, not dated), p. 21.

⁴³R. J. Rogers, "A Study of Leadership in the First Infantry Division During World War II: Terry de la Mesa Allen and Clarence Ralph Huebner," (Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1965), p. 11.

⁴⁴Allen, p. 2.

⁴⁵Rogers, p. 15.

⁴⁶H. R. Knickerbocker, Danger Forward, (Nashville: The Battery Press 1947), p. 46.

⁴⁷Allen, p. 21.

⁴⁸Rogers, p. 17.

⁴⁹Ibid, p. 17.

⁵⁰Howe, George F, United States Army in World War II, The Mediterranean Theater of Operations North West Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West, (Washington DC, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1957), pp. 487-492.

⁵¹Rogers, p. 18.

⁵²Ibid, p. 17.

⁵³Ibid, p. 19.

⁵⁴Ibid, p. 22.

⁵⁵Ibid, p. 22.

⁵⁶Howe, pp. 547-548.

⁵⁷Rogers, p. 25.

⁵⁸Ibid, p. 32.

⁵⁹Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier's Story, (New York, Henry Holt & Co), pp. 110-111.

⁶⁰Rogers, p. 40.

⁶¹Ibid, p. 42.

⁶²Ibid, p. 46.

⁶³Ibid, p. 46.

⁶⁴Ibid, p.28.

⁶⁵Rogers, p. 35.

⁶⁶Allen, p. 22.

⁶⁷Rogers, pp. 53-56. Clarence Ralph Huebner was born 24 November 1888 at Bushton, Kansas. He spent two years at Bushton High School and then transferred to a business college at Grand Island Nebraska.

He graduated in 1908 and enlisted in the Army. By 1916 he had achieved the rank of master sergeant. In 1916 he passed the examination for a commission. He was then commissioned a lieutenant of infantry.

During World War I, he fought as a member of the 1st Infantry Division in the Sommerville sector of France. He was wounded in action twice while leading his units in several battles. He returned to the U.S. and led the victory parades in New York as a regimental commander. He graduated from the Command and General Staff School in 1925 and the Army War College in 1929.

He was promoted to brigadier general in 1941. With this promotion he served as the director of training for the Army Service Forces until 1943. He served in North Africa as the theater G-3 and later as the deputy chief of staff for General Alexander's 21st Army Group headquarters. Huebner remained in this assignment until September of 1943 when he replaced General Allen as commander of the 1st Infantry Division.

He fought the 1st Division in Europe until 1944. Later, he would go on to command the V Army Corps. He remained in the Army until 1950. He retired as a lieutenant general. He died in Washington DC, in 1972.

⁶⁸Rogers, p. 61.

⁶⁹Bryce F. Denno, "Allen and Huebner: Contrast in Command," Army (June 1984): p. 69.

⁷⁰Rogers, p. 60.

⁷¹Denno, p. 69.

⁷²Ibid, p. 69.

⁷³Ibid, p. 65.

⁷⁴Rogers, p. 64.

⁷⁵Denno, p. 69.

⁷⁶Ibid, p. 71.

⁷⁷Rogers, p. 72.

⁷⁸Denno, p. 70.

⁷⁹Knickerbocker, p. 190.

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